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INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 2018, four unaccompanied alien children ("UACs") filed a
complaint for injunctive relief in the state of California against Alex Azar,
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"),
and Scott Lloyd, the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement
("ORR").' One of those children is seventeen year old Miguel Angel S., a
Mexican citizen detained at Yolo County Juvenile Detention Center.2 The
ORR took custody of Miguel Angel after his arrival at the U.S.-Mexico
border on or around May 16, 2017, and told him he would be released to his
father within three months.3
Since the ORR took custody of Miguel Angel, the ORR has transferred
him to another facility in Texas without providing Miguel Angel notice or a
right to appeal.4  ORR staff have repeatedly physically assaulted him.
5
During one incident, an employee tore Miguel Angel's earring from his
1. See Complaint, Lucas R. v. Alex Azar, No. 2:18-CV-05741, 1 (C.D. Cal. filed
June 29, 2018) (providing an overview of unreasonable force used on a UAC in ORR
custody).
2. See id. at 13 (confirming that Miguel is a UAC under the federal definition).
3. See id. at 40 (stating he was initially housed at the Southwest Kay shelter in
southern California).
4. See id. at 41 (stating Miguel Angel fears never being released).
5. See id. at 41-46 (detailing incidents at multiple facilities).
2
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earlobe.6 Shiloh staff held Miguel Angel against the wall while one
employee pressed his forearm across Miguel Angel's throat to make it
difficult to breathe. There was no disciplinary action; the ORR transferred
him again, without notice, to the Yolo Juvenile Detention Center soon after.8
Staffers at Yolo used pepper spray on his eyes and ears; to clean his eyes out,
Miguel Angel had no choice but to use water from the toilet in his cell
because staffers had cut off water to his sink.9 Miguel Angel is still waiting
to be reunited with his father; ORR has never given him a reason for why
they have not released his son. 1
Over 60,000 children crossed the U.S.-Mexico border in 2014. " With the
humanitarian crisis of family separation on the U.S.-Mexico border
dominating headlines, over 2,500 children were separated from their
families.' 2 As of August 16, 2018, over 500 children are still waiting to be
reunited with their parents in violation of a court order.' 3 As of February 3,
2019, the Trump administration is unsure how many children were actually
separated from their families; the number could be in the thousands.'
4
6. See id. at 44 (stating that a physician's assistant watched the attack and did
nothing).
7. See id. (describing how Miguel Angel was physically lifted off the floor by his
aris).
8. See id. at 45 (stating that other plaintiffs have been frequently transferred with
no notice to them or their families).
9. See id. at 46 (stating that Miguel Angel lost all hearing in one ear for several
days due to the pepper spray).
10. See id. at 48 (stating that a home investigator has cleared the apartment and all
appropriate documents submitted).
11. See Associated Press, Obama Calls Child Migrants an 'Urgent Humanitarian
Issue,' AL JAZEERA AMERICA (June 2, 2014),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/6/2/obama-child-immigrantsalone.html
(emphasizing the need for further aid after an uptick in child migrants crossing the U.S.
southern border in 2014).
12. See All Things Considered, Family Reunification Deadline Approaches, NPR,
https://www.npr.org/2018/07/22/631349973/reunification-deadline-approaches (last
visited Jul. 22, 2018) (stating there are more than 2,000 immigrant juveniles still waiting
to be reunited with their parents).
13. See Tal Kopan, Hundreds of Separated Children Not Reunited By Court-Ordered
Deadline, CNN https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/26/politics/family-separations-
deadline/index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2018) (stating that the Department of
Homeland Security declared the deadline had been met, while the American Civil
Liberties Union contested its completion).
14. See Lauren Pearle, Trump Administration Unsure if Thousands more Migrant
Families were Separated than Originally Estimated, Legal Filing Shows, ABC NEWS
(Feb. 2, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/beta-story-container/US/trump-administration-
2019]
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This Comment argues that the physical, emotional, and sexual abuse
endured by immigrant juveniles in ORR custody is unmonitored, state-
sanctioned abuse that violates both the Fifth and Eighth Amendments of the
U.S. Constitution as well as federal law.'5 Part II describes the ORR, federal
laws which impact it, and ORR policies for handling unaccompanied
immigrant children, including prevention of abuse and assault in
containment centers. 16 Part III investigates the role of the ORR as the
primary actor in state-sanctioned abuse and asserts through Fifth and Eighth
Amendment analyses that the physical and sexual abuse of immigrant
juveniles in ORR custody violates the juveniles' constitutional rights, the
Refugee Act, PREA, and the Flores settlement.17 Part IV recommends that
the ORR be held accountable for the actions of its contracted containment
facilities and that the U.S. government must provide immigrant juveniles
with proper constitutional protections.' 8 Part V concludes by reiterating that
immigrant juveniles experience state-sanctioned abuse by the ORR, which
amounts to both an unconstitutional lack of due process as required by the
Fifth Amendment and cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. 19
unsure-thousands-migrant-families-separated-originally/story?id= 60797633 (last visited
Feb. 3, 2019).
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (declaring
that inflicting cruel and unusual punishments is unconstitutional); infra Part III
(discussing the frequent violations of the Refugee Act, PREA, and the Flores
Settlement).
16. See Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Sexual Abuse and Assault in
Confinement Facilities, 79 Fed. Reg. 13100, 13117 (Mar. 7, 2014) (to be codified at 6
C.F.R. pt. 115) (calling the centers where the ORR house UACs "containment centers");
see also Prison Rape Elimination Act, 34 U.S.C. § 30302 (2017) (describing the purposes
of PREA). See generally Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Sexual Abuse
and Sexual Harassment Involving Unaccompanied Children, 79 Fed. Reg. 77768, 77768
(Dec. 24, 2014) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 411) (detailing specific strategies to
prevent sexual abuse of UACs).
17. See infra Part III (establishing that the treatment of immigrant juveniles in
detention is state-sanctioned abuse).
18. See infra Part IV (pushing for stronger judicial action to protect the rights of
immigrant juveniles).
19. See infra Part V (concluding that the ORR is participating in the state-sanctioned
abuse of immigrant juveniles).
4
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol27/iss3/5
BROKEN BONES AND PEPPER SPRAY
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Office of Refugee Resettlement
1. History
Congress's Refugee Act explicitly provided for the creation of the ORR.20
The ORR, run by a Director, creates programs to aid refugees in the U.S.,
including UACs, who are under the supervision of the Division of
Unaccompanied Children's Services ("DUCS"). 2' DUCS places UACs in
care, supervises the reunification process with qualified sponsors or family,
and oversees ORR-funded care facilities, as the ORR itself does not have the
capacity to house UACs alone.22 The Director assesses the needs of the
refugees in the ORR's care. 23 The ORR Director assumes legal and financial
responsibility for UACs; the Director is authorized to commit to contracts
with public or private agencies to provide childcare for UACs if he
determines agency conditions to be "appropriate. '24 The term "appropriate"
is undefined in the Refugee Act; however, as shown in D.B. v. Poston, the
ORR internally defines "appropriate" as a safe, stable environment without
threat of abuse, domestic violence, or unsafe behavior.
2 1
2. Immigrant Juveniles Are Only Protected Through a Patchwork of
Policies
After Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act ("PREA") in
2003, President Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum declaring that
PREA applied to all federal confinement facilities, not just facilities overseen
by the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). 26 ORR confinement facilities were
20. See Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1521(a) (1980) (establishing the ORR,
which is headed by a Director appointed by the HHS Secretary).
21. See id. (stating that the ORR's function is to both fund and administer programs
for refugees); see also Office of Refugee Resettlement, Divisions Unaccompanied
Children's Services (Oct. 3, 2012), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/divisions-
unaccompanied-childrens-services (describing DCS, also known as DUCS).
22. See Office of Refugee Resettlement, Divisions Unaccompanied Children's
Services (Oct. 3, 2012), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/divisions-
unaccompanied-childrens-services (describing the full extent of DUCS obligations).
23. See 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(3) (stating that the ORR must conduct periodic
assessments to determine the needs of refugees).
24. See id. § 1522(d)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) (neglecting to define "appropriate" in-statute).
25. See D.B. v. Poston, 119 F. Supp. 3d 472, 484 (E.D. Va. 2015) (describing
conditions of a rejected rehousing situation in an ORR custody case and listing reasons
why the home was not "appropriate").
26. See Prison Rape Elimination Act, 34 U.S.C. § 30302 (2017) (defining the
2019]
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directed to modify or create new sets of rules and procedures which would
satisfy PREA's requirements. PREA has nine overall purposes, including
the establishment of a zero-tolerance standard for prison rape; increasing the
accountability of prison officials; and protecting the Eighth Amendment
rights of prisoners, including, according to the memorandum, UACs in ORR
custody.28 To comply with President Obama's memorandum, the ORR
produced operating procedures "appropriate for its care provider facilities.
29
The ORR Director may contract with public and private agencies to house
UACs; as such, the ORR also drafted supplemental procedures for these
agencies which complied with the National Prison Rape Elimination
Commission's ("NPREC") recommended standards.30
When the ORR takes custody of a UAC, the ORR's Division of
Unaccompanied Children's Services ("DUCS") undertakes oversight of the
child to place them in shelter care.3' As the ORR is a government agency, it
cannot house children on its own and instead must contract out to these
agencies to provide the care stipulated in its mandate.3 2 The ORR requires
that licensed programs and facilities comply with child welfare laws of the
states in which they are situated and provide physical and mental health
services as necessary.33 While there are different levels of ORR facilities for
UACs, depending on their categorization, all programs must comply with
child welfare laws.34
purposes of PREA).
27. See Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Sexual Abuse and Sexual
Harassment Involving Unaccompanied Children, 79 Fed. Reg. 77768, 77770 (Dec. 24,
2014) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 411) (establishing administrative tactics for
containment centers to handle sexual abuse and assault).
28. See 34 U.S.C. § 30302 (listing the purposes of PREA).
29. See Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Sexual Abuse and Sexual
Harassment Involving Unaccompanied Children, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77770 (defining care
provider facilities as shelters, group homes, and residential treatment centers, among
others).
30. See id. (describing further types of detainment centers).
31. See Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Sexual Abuse and Assault in
Confinement Facilities, 79 Fed. Reg. 13100, 13117 (Mar. 7, 2014) (to be codified at 6
C.F.R. 115) (stating that detained immigrant juveniles must be quickly placed within
ORR custody).
32. See Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1522(d)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) (1980) (enabling the
Director to contract with facilities to house UACs, as the ORR is a government agency).
33. See Services to Unaccompanied Alien Children, 69 Fed. Reg. 40950, 40950-51
(Jul. 7, 2004) (listing all services which must be offered by the ORR to UACs).
34. See id.; see also Office of Refugee Resettlement, Children Entering the United
States Unaccompanied: Guide to Terms (Mar. 21, 2016),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/children-entering-the-united-states-
6
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B. Constitutional Rights and Wrongs: The Fifth and Eighth Amendment
as Applied (Or Not) in Juvenile Detention
1. Reno v. Flores
In 1993, four immigrant juvenile detainees filed a class action on behalf
of immigrant juveniles in the District Court for the Central District of
California.35 The government detained each juvenile on suspicion of being
deportable; the plaintiffs claimed that even as immigrant juveniles, they had
a fundamental right to be free from physical restraint, and to detain them
indefinitely violated their substantive due process rights.3 6 The Supreme
Court found that their detention was not unconstitutional as long as
conditions of custody were both decent and humane.3 7 The ruling in Flores
stated that the regulation which permitted the federal government to hold
UACs would have a time limit based on the deportation hearings; in practice,
it effectively means a child can remain in ORR custody indefinitely if no
relative or legal guardian comes forward to take custody.38 The ruling is
explicitly qualified by decent and humane custody for the detained child.3 9
The Flores Settlement, entered into a few years later, emphasizes that
unaccompanied minors must be held in safe, sanitary facilities.
40
2. R.G. v. Koller and Agency Liability Under the Constitution
The plaintiffs in R. G. v. Koller were three LGBTQ delinquents held at the
Hawaii Youth Correctional Facility ("HYCF") who filed against the state for
violations of their due process rights.4 ' Plaintiffs experienced a myriad of
unaccompanied-guide-to-terms (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) (detailing the difference
between group homes, extended care group homes, influx care facilities, long term foster
care, shelters, and residential treatment centers).
35. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 292 (1993) (ruling that regulations regarding
the release of immigrant juveniles to only their parents, close relatives, or legal guardians
do not violate substantive due process).
36. See id. at 300 (claiming that further detention of the immigrant juveniles was a
denial of their substantive due process rights).
37. See id. at 303 (stating that preserving a child's welfare has a rational connection
to a government interest).
38. See id. at 322 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the INS rule did not pose a
time limit and that the only tool UACs have to appeal their custody is seeking a writ of
habeas corpus).
39. See id. at 303 (stating that the conditions must be humane).
40. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement at 4, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-
RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. 1997) (describing the safety and sanitary standard of housing for
unaccompanied minors in INS custody).
41. See R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1133 (D. Haw. 2006) (holding that the
2019]
7
Bruce: Broken Bones and Pepper Spray: The State-Sanctioned Abuse of Immi
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2019
438 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 27:3
homophobic attacks, including pervasive verbal abuse, physical assault, and
sexual assault; staffers also placed the plaintiffs into solitary confinement
without cause. 42 The court in R. G. v. Koller declined to examine the Eighth
Amendment claims of the juveniles confined at HYCF because the Eighth
Amendment applies only to people convicted of crimes.43 Instead, the court
examined the abuse, isolation, harassment, neglect, and assault that plaintiffs
experienced under the Due Process principle of the Fourteenth
Amendment.44 The court concluded that isolation in particular had violated
the due process rights of the plaintiffs detained in HYCF.45 The court also
concluded that the staff's negligence at HYCF was deliberate and allowed
for extensive abuse of the plaintiffs.46
In contrast to R.G. v. Koller, the District Court of Texas in Walding v.
United States declined to decide the due process rights of immigrant
juveniles abused at an ORR-contracted detention center in Nixon, Texas
because plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that employees of the ORR acted
with deliberate indifference to the abusive conditions at the center.4 7 The
ORR contracts with public and private institutions on behalf of the federal
government, so all claims of deliberate negligence fall under the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, and the case was analyzed as such.
48
While being held at the Away From Home, Inc. ("AFH") facility, plaintiffs
claimed that employees of the facility repeatedly physically and sexually
juveniles had the standing to file a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment).
42. See id. at 1143-50 (describing the full extent of the many months of abuse and
assault).
43. Compare R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1152 (D. Haw. 2006) (stating
that the wards of HYCF are delinquent and have not yet been convicted of a crime), with
Cdsar Cuauhtdmoc Garcia Hemdndez, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV.
1457, 1458 (2014) (analyzing the intersection of criminal law and immigration law silos
and claiming the current system essentially condenses immigration offenses into criminal
offenses).
44. See R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1152 (applying the Bell test to determine
whether conditions or restrictions in pre-trial detention are punitively intended by
determining whether they have any purpose outside of punishment).
45. See id. at 1155 (stating that the use of isolation in HYCF constituted punishment
and was a blatant violation of the plaintiffs' due process rights).
46. See id. at 1156 (holding that the plaintiffs' evidence showed HYCF conditions
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment).
47. See Walding v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 2d 759, 788 (W.D. Tex. 2013)
(stating that while the ORR did not act promptly, it also was not deliberately indifferent).
48. See Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1522(d)(2)(A) (Mar. 17, 1980) (granting
the ORR Director the ability to contract with public and private agencies for housing
UACs).
8
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assaulted them. 49 Employees yanked plaintiffs from their beds and threw
them to the floor; intoxicated and sober staff beat the plaintiffs and threw
them against walls and doors.50 Eight of the plaintiffs alleged that a female
staffer sexually abused them recurrently; another plaintiff claimed a female
supervisor sexually assaulted him in the shower." In September 2006, the
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services ("TDFPS") informed
the ORR of the allegations; AFH, despite knowing of the incident since that
past April, had not reported it to the ORR, and the agency further kept its
contract with the ORR until 2007.52 An independent monitor from the
International Catholic Migration Commission submitted a deposition
detailing the violent nature of physical restraint protocols at AFH, including
unjustified force, such as dragging a runaway back to the facility with his
arms behind his back. 3
After the court dismissed the plaintiffs' first suit in Walding, the plaintiffs
filed a second suit, E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, against ORR employees in their
individual capacities.54 Agency discretion determined the extent of ORR
supervision over the juvenile holding facilities: the court ruled that the
ORR's response to the abuse allegations from children who lived in AFH
was reasonable due to the discretionary function exception of the Federal
Tort Claims Act ("FTCA").55 The discretionary function exception means
that claims founded on the exercise of or failure to exercise a discretionary
function by a federal agency do not allow for liability claims against agency
employees or the agency itself.56 To apply the exception, a court must first
49. See Walding, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 767-68 (detailing the assaults which took place
between September 2006 and March 2007).
50. See id. (naming multiple AFH staff members who abused the plaintiffs at the
facility).
51. See id. (stating that the female staffer immediately resigned).
52. See id. at 767-68 (stating that as AFH had not reported the incident to TDFPS,
TDFPS had cited AFH; the ORR decided that it could further oversee AFH to prevent
sexual assault from occurring again in future).
53. See E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, 600 Fed. App'x 205, 212 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating the
monitor informed the ORR of these incidents in the summer and fall of 2005).
54. Compare Walding v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 2d 759, 788 (W.D. Tex. 2013)
(dismissing the plaintiffs' claims against the AFH facility and the U.S. under the
discretionary function exception), with E.A.FF. v. Gonzalez, 600 Fed. App'x 205, 215
(5th Cir. 2015) (denying the plaintiffs' Bivens claim because the ORR did not meet the
standard of deliberate indifference).
55. See Walding v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 2d 759, 791 (W.D. Tex. 2013)
(stating the definition of "employee of the government" excludes contracting agencies).
56. See Fabian v. Dunn, No. SA-08-CV-269-XR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, at
*25 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (stating that Congress intended the exception to prevent second-
2019]
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determine whether the legally challenged actions of federal officers were
discretionary or controlled by some mandatory regulation; if the actions were
discretionary, the court must then decide if it was the kind of judgment the
exception protects.5
The court also ruled that the ORR could not be held accountable for the
actions of its contracted employees through the FTCA's independent
contractor exception.5' An independent contractor, as described by the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") is the payer (in this case, the ORR) can
direct only the result of the work they have paid the contractor to do, not
what or how that work will be done.5 9 The independent contractor exception
waives all immunity for the government and government employees if they
commit negligent or wrongful acts or omissions while acting in the scope of
their employment; government employee is defined only as officers or
employees of federal agencies, which AFH staff were not.
60
3. The Use of Bivens Claims to Overrule Fifth Amendment Due Process
Complaints by Immigrant Juveniles
In 1972, the Supreme Court held in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics that federal officers have no immunity to
protect themselves from damages in suits claiming violations of the
constitutional rights of prisoners or detainees. 61  The Bivens claims
theoretically enforce accountability among federal officers and agencies, but
courts often rely on the discretionary function exception of the FTCA to
decide these cases.62
In Fabian v. Dunn, a group of immigrant juveniles, held at the Abraxas
detention center in Texas, contended that facility staff were physically
guessing judicial, legislative, or administrative intentions in policy).
57. See id. (providing no examples of administrative intent that should be protected
by the exception).
58. See Walding, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 791 (detailing the independent contractor
exception).
59. See Understanding Employee vs. Contractor Designation, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE (July 20, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/understanding-employee-vs-
contractor-designation (last visited Jan. 30, 2019) (describing the legal difference
between an employee and a contractor).
60. See id. (clarifying the definition of"government employee").
61. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456
F.2d 1339, 1341 (1972) (involving an unreasonable search and seizure, Bivens can apply
to violations of all constitutional amendments).
62. See id.; see also E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, 600 Fed. App'x 205, 208 (5th Cir. 2015)
(declining to examine the Bivens claim).
10
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abusing them.63 They also claimed that the ORR was purposefully
indifferent regarding the standards of monitoring, supervision, and selection
of housing facilities for UACs.6 4 Facility staff beat the plaintiffs with fists,
feet, and chairs; the staff also dragged the plaintiffs out of their beds and
threw them to the floor. 6' The verbal abuse was so horrific that one plaintiff
attempted suicide.66 The plaintiffs in Fabian claimed that they informed
Abraxas staff of the assaults and notified both visiting ORR employees and
TDFPS. 67 Their Bivens claim stated that the ORR took no action to prevent
the abuse and instead allowed it to continue. 68 The court in Fabian dismissed
the plaintiffs' Bivens claim by concluding the plaintiffs failed to show that
the ORR defendants caused plaintiffs deprivation of their constitutional
rights.69 Similarly, in E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, the court declined to decide
whether the due process rights of the UACs who were sexually, physically,
and emotionally abused at the AFH facility in Nixon, Texas had been
violated.7 0 The plaintiffs in E.A.F.F. alleged that it was the ORR officials'
deliberate indifference in their individual capacities that violated the
plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment due process rights, but the Fifth Circuit
dismissed these claims.
4. The Bell Test, Farmer v. Brennan, and Pre-Trial Detention
In 1977, Ingraham v. Wright established that Eighth Amendment scrutiny
applies only to people convicted of a crime. 2 Two years later, Bell v. Wolfish
63. See Fabian v. Dunn, No. SA-08-CV-269-XR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, at
* 11 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (detailing the abuse).
64. See id. at * 15 (claiming the ORR's purposeful indifference resulted in the abuse
at the Abraxas facility).
65. See id. at *5-6 (clarifying that on one occasion intoxicated staff arrived at the
facility and assaulted detainees).
66. See id. at *6-7 (stating that the Abraxas staff denied him medical care and placed
him in solitary confinement).
67. See id. at *9 (claiming that the defendants had informed other federal authorities
of the abuse, yet no government agency took any measures to prevent it from continuing).
68. See id. at * 11 (detailing plaintiffs' Bivens claim).
69. See Fabian v. Dunn, No. SA-08-CV-269-XR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348 *1,
*28 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (stating that the claim was dismissed through the discretionary
function exception).
70. See E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, 600 Fed. App'x 205, 208 (5th Cir. 2015) (detailing the
claims made by the plaintiffs).
71. See id. (dismissing the plaintiffs' Bivens claim and stating ORR staff in their
individual capacities could not be held accountable for the abuse at the facility).
72. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (declaring that cruel and unusual punishment shall
not be inflicted on any person in the U.S.); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
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established the Bell test to determine whether the conditions of a pre-trial
detainee's confinement amounted to punishment .7 ' For pre-trial detention to
be unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment, plaintiffs must show that
detention centers applied certain conditions or restrictions with an intent to
punish. The court in Bell also held that if a condition or restriction is
arbitrary or purposeless, it can reasonably be inferred to be meant
punitively. 7' Detention centers can have restrictions and conditions of
confinement so long as the conditions are not punitive. 6
The Supreme Court's decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson functioned
along the same lines; pre-trial detainees must show that the use of force by
officers was objectively unreasonable for a court to declare the force
excessive. 7 7 What is objectively unreasonable depends on the facts of the
case: courts must decide based on both the perspective of a reasonable officer
and the government's legitimate interest in managing the facility. 8 The use
of objectively unreasonable force violates detainees' Fifth Amendment
rights to due process.
Finally, in Farmer v. Brennan, a transgender woman brought a successful
Bivens suit against prison officials for displaying deliberate indifference to
the dangers she faced when officials placed her in the general population of
an all-male prison. 80 As a result, the plaintiff was repeatedly physically and
sexually assaulted.8 ' In deciding Farmer, the Supreme Court declared that
prison officers can be liable under the Eighth Amendment if they are aware
that prisoners face a substantial risk of being harmed and fail to take
671-72 (1977) (declaring that the Fifth Amendment protects pre-trial detainees and the
Eighth Amendment protects convicted felons).
73. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 520 (1979) (determining that pre-trial
detainees are not punished by regular practice).
74. See id. (holding if a condition or restriction is so arbitrary that a court may
"reasonably infer" the intent behind the action is punishment, it is unconstitutional).
75. See id. (neglecting to explain how to determine whether something is arbitrary).
76. See id. (holding that confinement conditions do not amount to punishment if they
are not intentional or actionably punitive).
77. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2466 (2015) (holding that the
applicable test is objective and not subjective unreasonableness).
78. See id. at 2473 (mandating the consideration ofjail administration policies).
79. See id. (referencing Bell in its decision to defer to jail officials' policy
judgements).
80. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 825 (1994) (stating that prison officials
may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to health or
safety of inmates).
81. See id. at 830 (stating that plaintiff did not voice an objection to officials about
the initial transfer).
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reasonable measures to prevent or abate that harm. 82 While prison conditions
sometimes mean that inmates may suffer severe harm, it is the deliberate
indifference to that harm on the part of prison officials which may result in
liability under the Eighth Amendment.83
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Contracted Agencies of the ORR are State Actors Whose State-
Sanctioned Abuses Violate the Refugee Act, the Prison Rape Elimination
Act, and the Constitutional Rights of Immigrant Juveniles
Through the application of the discretionary function and independent
contractor exceptions of the FTCA, courts have excused the ORR from
liability for the abuse heaped upon immigrant juveniles by its contracting
agencies.84 Under the discretionary function exception, claims based on the
exercise or failure to exercise a discretionary function by a federal agency
do not allow for liability claims against the agency or its employees.85 Even
though the ORR constructed PREA-mandated regulations to prevent
physical and sexual assault from occurring in the facilities contracted to
house UACs, incidents still occur in the ORR's contracted facilities.86 The
independent contractor exception states that the government and government
employees acting within the scope of their employment waive all immunity
by committing negligent or wrongful acts or omissions.87 The FTCA limits
the definition of "employee of the government" only to officers or employees
of federal agencies, excluding any contractors regardless of the focus or
82. See id. at 825-26 (elaborating further that deliberate indifference is more than
negligence, but less than acts or omissions intentionally causing harm).
83. See id. at 834 (clarifying that prison officials cannot be deliberately indifferent
to severe potential harm of prisoners, but do not have to ensure prisoners never injure
each other).
84. See Walding v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 2d 759, 791 (W.D. Tex. 2013)
(excusing the ORR from liability under the independent contractor exception).
85. See id. (crafting the definition to exclude independent contractors even in cases
where the agency cannot perform its duties alone).
86. See Fabian v. Dunn, No. SA-08-CV-269-XR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, at
*25 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2009) (explaining Congress' intent to prevent second-guessing
judicial intentions); see also Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Sexual Abuse
and Sexual Harassment Involving Unaccompanied Children, 79 Fed. Reg. 77768, 77770
(Dec. 24, 2014) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 411) (describing administrative tactics to
handle sexual abuse allegations in confinement).
87. See Walding, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 759, 791 (describing the independent contractor
exception as applied in the AFH case).
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purpose of the federal agency that contracts them.88 By definition, this
removes the ORR from liability when constitutional violations occur in
public and private agencies or companies contracted by the ORR.89 To hold
the United States accountable for the actions of contractors, the employees
at fault must be government employees as defined by the FTCA.90
At first glance, the issues presented by cases such as E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez
and Fabian v. Dunn appear to be solely constitutional; however, the actions
undertaken by the courts violate two federal laws and the ORR's own
standards of practice. 9 1 Cases such as Walding v. United States and the
charges levied against the ORR in Lucas R. v. Alex Azar state that continued
use of discretionary function and independent contractor exceptions to
dismiss suits against the ORR excuse the agency from responsibility for the
actions of its contracted agencies.92 Similarly, continued use of these
exceptions ensure that the ORR, through its contracted agencies, continues
to violate the Refugee Act and PREA standards. 93
The usage of the discretionary function and independent contractor
exceptions by the courts prevent the plaintiffs in each case from holding the
people who made the initial decisions to house the plaintiffs in inappropriate
facilities or dangerous conditions accountable. 94 When an agency like the
ORR has no ability to house UACs, the agency is obligated to make contracts
with public and private agencies to provide beds, physical and mental health
care, and food to UACs coming into the United States.95 These agencies are,
88. See id. (describing the independent contractor exception).
89. See E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, 600 Fed. App'x 205, 208 (5th Cir. 2015) (establishing
a Bivens claim against the U.S. government for the actions of the AFH staffers); see also
Fabian, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, at *5-11, (describing the ORR's lack of reaction
to allegations of abuse at the Abraxas facility despite its internal protocols).
90. See Walding v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 2d 759, 791 (W.D. Tex. 2013)
(stating that the definition includes but is not limited to "officers and employees of any
federal agency" of the United States).
91. See id. (defining "federal agency" as excluding "any contractor with the United
States").
92. See id. at 767-68 (describing assaults which took place without interference from
either the ORR or an independent monitor); see also Complaint, Lucas R. v. Alex Azar,
No. 2:18-CV-05741, 1, 41-46 (C.D. Cal. filed Jun. 29, 2018) (describing one of the
assaults against Miguel Angel without ORR retribution).
93. See Walding, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 762 (excusing the agency under the exceptions);
see also Fabian v. Dunn, No. SA-08-CV-269-XR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, at *15
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2009) (further detailing the plaintiffs' Bivens claim).
94. See Walding, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 759 (immunizing the ORR under the
discretionary function exception).
95. See Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1522(d)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) (1980) (neglecting
14
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effectively, ORR employees, as the ORR cannot possibly house the UACs
by itself.96 Public and private agencies contracted by the ORR therefore
perform the ORR's duties on a day-to-day basis. 9' According to the FTCA,
the contracted facilities do not count as employees since the facilities are
contracting with a federal agency rather than operating as employees of the
government. 98 However, the contracting of public and private organizations
to perform the ORR's own functions makes those contracted agencies
employees of the ORR and, thus, of the federal government because the
ORR's very existence as a government agency makes the ORR functionally
incapable of housing immigrant juveniles. 99
Similarly, rather than transferring custody of the UACs from the ORR
Director to the contracted facilities, the UACs remain in the fiscal, legal
guardianship of the ORR Director; the Director is responsible for UACs in
the United States and deliberately places them in the care of the
"appropriate" contracted facilities it employs.'00 The agency staff care for
UACs on behalf of the ORR where the ORR cannot functionally do so; the
staff act in the ORR's stead, are fiscally rewarded by the ORR's contract,
and are susceptible to ORR's denial of further employment if required.'0 '
The contracted agencies are the ORR's responsibility. 10 2 Thus, when the
ORR contracts with an agency that it later discovers is violating the
constitutional rights of the immigrant juveniles the ORR placed there, and
the ORR does not rectify the situation, then the ORR not only breaks the law
to define "appropriate" within the statute).
96. See id. § 1522(d)(2)(A) (endowing the Director with the ability to contract with
appropriate agencies since the ORR cannot house UACs and thus could not perform its
function without the contractors).
97. See id. (at § 1522(c)(1)(establishing the ORR's contracted agencies as its
functioning employees).
98. See Walding v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 2d 759, 791 (W.D. Tex. 2013)
(determining that only direct employees of a federal agency count as government
employees under the FTCA).
99. See 8 U.S.C. § 1522(d)(2)(A) (ensuring the ORR Director may contract with
public and private agencies to ensure that UACs have housing).
100. See id. (enabling the Director to contract with agencies to house UACs due to
the Director's custody of those UACs); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1522(d)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii)
(establishing the ORR Director as the fiscal and legal caretaker of UACs while the
"appropriate" contracted detention centers hold the UACs).
101. See Walding, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 811 (holding that the ORR is in the business of
contracting with appropriate care facilities, not providing childcare).
102. See 8 U.S.C. § 1522(d)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) (declaring the ORR Director is responsible
for the care of UACs in the United States, including UACs confined at contracted
housing facilities).
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regarding appropriate housing but also violates the constitutional rights of
those juveniles by continuing to house them in an allegedly abusive and
inappropriate facility. 103 The ORR has the power and responsibility to decide
whether to continue or terminate these contracts; by knowingly enabling
abuse to persist, the agency is countermanding the Refugee Act and violating
the UACs' constitutional rights. 10 4 The courts' use of both the discretionary
function exception and the independent contractor exception of the FTCA
effectively negate the ORR's responsibility in cases of abuse and enable the
ORR to violate constitutional law. 105
The ORR's continued employment of agencies that repeatedly violate the
constitutional rights of the UACs they are supposed to shelter is not merely
a constitutional problem; it also results in the ORR directly violating the
Refugee Act. 0 6 The ORR can only contract with public or private agencies
regarded as "appropriate" under the Act; this term is not defined in statute.l17
Rather, as indicated in a footnote in D.B. v. Poston, the ORR's definition of
"appropriate" - at least when it comes to house checks for sponsors or
relatives of immigrant juveniles - require the home to be safe, stable, and
lacking threats of abuse, domestic violence, or other forms of unsafe
behavior. 108 The standard for ORR-contracted facilities appear to be lower,
as shown in Walding v. United States, where the definition of "appropriate"
housing sometimes amounts to "available and not stricken with chicken
pox."' 1 9 The same standard regarding "appropriate" housing for relatives
103. See id. (stating that UACs brought to the ORR to be cared for are in the direct
fiscal and legal supervision of the ORR Director and no one else). See generally
Walding, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 773, 781 (maintaining that the ORR is not obligated to
provide care without contracting with agencies, but must fulfill its function of serving
refugees in the United States).
104. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (establishing protections for liberty and property
rights); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1522(d)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) (declaring the ORR as the sole
caretaker of UACs).
105. See Walding, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 762 (applying both the discretionary function
exception and independent contractor exception and excusing the ORR from liability).
106. See 8 U.S.C. § 1522(d)(2)(A) (establishing that the Director may only make
housing contracts with agencies he deems appropriate).
107. See id. § 1522(d)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) (establishing the duties of the Director and
providing no definitions).
108. See D.B. v. Poston, 119 F. Supp. 3d 472, 484 (E.D. Va. 2015) (listing domestic
violence and substance abuse as reasons that prevented the release of an immigrant
juvenile to his mother).
109. See Walding, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 765 (describing DUCS as facing a crisis and
potentially violating the Flores settlement due to a chicken pox outbreak at other
facilities and rising apprehension numbers on the border).
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and immigrant sponsors should apply to agencies and facilities the ORR
contracts as mass housing units." 0
The conditions at the AFH facility in Nixon, Texas were clearly anything
but appropriate according to the standard set forward in D.B. v. Poston.11
The Wa/ding case involved negligent investigations of physical and sexual
abuse allegations, negligent supervision, and negligent oversight. 112 Rather
than hold the ORR, a federal agency, accountable for its behavior regarding
the AFH facility, the court dismissed the charges." 3 Similarly, the Shiloh,
Yolo, and Abraxas facilities - all of which have repeated allegations from
immigrant juveniles confined inside of physical, emotional, or sexual assault
- could not be described as appropriate under the ORR's own definition.'
14
Being thrown or held against the wall, sprayed in the eyes and ears with
pepper spray, or beaten by drunk staff members does not fulfill the ORR's
standard in D.B. v. Poston, or the colloquial definition of "appropriate."" ' 5
The ORR continues to contract with these facilities despite allegations of
physical and sexual abuse that would clearly label outside institutions and
living situations unacceptable. 116
The District Court of Hawaii determined that the abuse, isolation, and rape
110. See D.B., 119 F. Supp. 3d at 484 (holding that the immigrant juvenile could not
be released to his mother due to the conditions of the home and her relationship with the
juvenile's stepfather).
111. See Walding, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 801 (maintaining that the ORR and its
employees were not accountable for the actions of those fired from the AFH facility);
see also D.B. 119 F. Supp. 3d at 484 (determining that physical abuse would not make a
home or living situation "appropriate" by ORR standards).
112. See generally Walding, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 781-782 (reviewing the ORR's actions
upon learning of incidents at the AFH facility).
113. See id. at 775-76 (declaring the acquisition of the AFH facility as an acceptable
decision).
114. See D.B. v. Poston, 119 F. Supp. 3d 472, 484 (E.D. Va. 2015) (describing
conditions of a rejected rehousing situation in an ORR custody case and listing reasons
why the home was not "appropriate"); see also Complaint, Lucas R. v. Alex Azar, No.
2:18-CV-05741, 44 (C.D. Cal. filed June 29, 2018) (stating that Miguel Angel was held
off the floor by his arms while being choked by center employees).
115. See D.B. v. Poston, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 483 (noting that the ORR believed it could
not release the UAC due to an inappropriate environment). Compare Complaint, Lucas
R. v. Alex Azar, No. 2:18-CV-05741, 44 (C.D. Cal. filed June 29, 2018) (noting that
no abusive member of staff had been punished), with Fabian v. Dunn, No. SA-08-CV-
269-XR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, *1, *11 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (describing the abuse
allegations at the facility and the ORR's indifference).
116. See Complaint, Lucas R. v. Alex Azar, No. 2:18-CV-05741, 44 (C.D. Cal. filed
June 29, 2018) (stating that Miguel Angel was transferred to a new facility after the
incident without notice or appeal).
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of the minor plaintiffs in R.G. v. Koller were the result of the neglect and
inadequate supervision of the HYCF staff, and held that staff accountable."11
The similar circumstances of negligence, abuse, and sexual assault in
Walding v. United States is likewise treated." 8  Such abuses indicate
inadequate supervision of containment centers contracted by the ORR: in
2003, the ORR awarded the contract to AFH, and in August 2006, TDFPS
informed the ORR of sexual abuse allegations in the center. 119 AFH retained
its contract with the ORR until more sexual abuse allegations emerged in
2007 when the ORR suspended placements at the facility. 2 ' The ORR
agreed to contract with AFH to house children at the facility, and preserved
the contract when the first of these incidents took place rather than
terminating its contract or more actively supervising AFH and its policies.121
The ORR did this despite being told that AFH actively covered up sexual
abuse allegations in 2006, requiring TDFPS to inform the ORR in AFH's
place. 122 In many ways, this directly parallels the experiences of the LGBTQ
juveniles in HYCF; in Koller, however, the court held the staff who
perpetuated similar standards of deliberate neglect and inadequate
supervision in HYCF directly accountable. 123 By continuing to contract with
these facilities, despite the clear violation of the ORR's own definition of
"appropriate," the ORR is in violation of its mandate under the Refugee Act
to properly house, care for, and be the legal and fiscal guardian of UACs held
in its custody. 1
24
117. See R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1156 (D. Haw. 2006) (holding that the
treatment of the children was directly caused by the inaction of the center staff).
118. Compare Walding, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 768 (noting the lack of immediate,
effective responses from ORR employees), with R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129,
1147 (D. Haw. 2006) (alleging similar allegations of sexual abuse and awareness of
supervisory staff).
119. See Walding, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 767-68 (stating that after the last incident, all
UACs were removed from the AFH facility).
120. See id. at 768 (stating that the ORR learned of sexual abuse allegations against
AFH worker Belinda Leal on Feb. 10, 2007).
121. See id. (stating that after reviewing AFH's files and recalling previous issues, the
ORR declined to renew the grant it had previously awarded to AFH).
122. See id. at 767 (stating that TDFPS had to inform the ORR in place of AFH since
AFH actively disguised the site from TDFPS for its handling of the sexual assault
allegation).
123. See R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1156 (D. Haw. 2006) (holding that the
staff directly created an atmosphere that was cruel and unusual through deliberate
ignorance of the homophobic and transphobic abuse).
124. See Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1522(d)(2)(A) (1980) (declaring that the
Director may make contracts with "appropriate" facilities to provide care to UACs).
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The ORR and its affiliated contractors are also in direct violation of PREA,
as extended to cover the facilities, agencies, halfway houses, and care
providers contracted by the ORR to provide beds for UACs.125 Under the
regulations implemented by the ORR after the Presidential Memorandum
extended PREA to cover ORR facilities, if an inmate or detainee reports
sexual abuse or sexual harassment, the ORR must monitor and evaluate the
facility to ensure that it operates according to federal and state guidelines. 126
The ORR seemed to follow this guideline in Walding and E.A.F.F., but
preserved the contract with the AFH facility despite the further rise of
physical and sexual assault allegations that resulted in more assaults. 127 This
pattern also arises in different cases. 128 By allowing the staff to remain, and
by either re-contracting or preserving the facility's contract, the ORR is
actively contradicting its own standards of review. 129  This creates an
atmosphere in which physical and sexual abusers can abuse immigrant
juveniles without fear of recrimination in violation of federal law, and where
the constitutional rights of UACs are at high risk of routine violation. 3 0
Through the repeated violation of both the mandate provided by the
Refugee Act and the standards of care required by PREA, the ORR and its
affiliates consistently violated the Fifth Amendment due process rights of
immigrant juveniles.' 3 ' UACs, like other pre-trial detainees and convicted
prisoners, have the right to live in detention without physical, sexual, or
125. See generally Prison Rape Elimination Act, 34 U.S.C. § 30302 (2017) (applying
national PREA standards for UAC facilities); see also Standards to Prevent, Detect, and
Respond to Sexual Abuse and Sexual Harassment Involving Unaccompanied Children,
79 Fed. Reg. 77768, 77769-70 (Dec. 24, 2014) (describing the implementation of the
Presidential Memorandum and the ORR's development of relevant standards).
126. See Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Sexual Abuse and Sexual
Harassment Involving Unaccompanied Children, 79 Fed. Reg. 77768, 77797 (Dec. 24,
2014) (detailing how the ORR must monitor and evaluate facilities after an allegation).
127. See E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, 600 Fed. App'x 205, 208 (5th Cir. 2015) (detailing
that one staff member was fired for sexual abuse, but others were not).
128. See Complaint, Lucas R. v. Alex Azar, No. 2:18-CV-05741, 41-46 (C.D. Cal.
filed June 29, 2018) (stating that no member of staff has been fired); see also Fabian v.
Dunn, No. SA-08-CV-269-XR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348 *1, *8 (W.D. Tex. 2009)
(detailing that one juvenile was verbally abused so horrifically that he attempted suicide).
129. See Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Sexual Abuse and Sexual
Harassment Involving Unaccompanied Children, 79 Fed. Reg. 77768, 77797 (Dec. 24,
2014) (outlining that after a sexual abuse allegation has been made, action must be taken
to prevent more assaults from occurring).
130. See Fabian, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, at *8 (describing staff isolating a
suicidal juvenile rather than providing psychiatric care).
131. See id. at *10 (emphasizing that the plaintiffs believed it was the ORR's
indifference that resulted in the abuse at Abraxas).
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emotional abuse. 3 2 By refusing to comply with federal law, the ORR is
violating that right.'33
B. District Courts Misapply Avenues for Legal Recourse Meant to Protect
Immigrant Juveniles from Abuse in ORR Custody
1. Court Applications of the Discretionary Function Exception Violate
Both the Flores Settlement and the Fifth Amendment Rights of Immigrant
Juveniles in ORR Custody
The repeated dismissal of Bivens claims against the ORR explicitly
violates the holding of the Flores settlement, which was decided to protect
the constitutional rights of UACs kept in federal detention. 3 4 The Flores
settlement dictates that the government can hold immigrant juveniles in
detention without violating their constitutional rights only if there is no
parent, guardian, or care provider to release them to, and so long as they are
kept in decent and humane conditions while in federal custody. 3 5 If these
conditions are not decent and humane, then the ORR, through the agencies
it contracts, violates the constitutional rights of immigrant juveniles as
described in the Flores settlement.1
36
The need for viable outlets for immigrant juveniles to assert violations of
their constitutional rights while in pre-trial detention is undeniable. 137 Bivens
claims are supposed to provide that outlet, but are subverted by courts
through the application of the discretionary function and independent
132. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (declaring liberty and property rights frequently used
as protections against prison assault).
133. See Prison Rape Elimination Act, 34. U.S.C. § 30302(7) (2017) (stating that one
of the purposes of PREA is to protect the Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners).
134. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993) (emphasizing the importance of
protecting the constitutional rights of UACs).
135. See id. at 303 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that keeping a child in custody is
not punitive so long as it is not conducted in excess).
136. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing liberty and property rights in conditions
which are humane); see also Flores, 507 U.S. at 303 (holding that immigrant juveniles
held in detention must be kept in a safe, humane environment to prevent the violation of
their rights). But see Stipulated Settlement Agreement at 5, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-
4544-RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. 1997) (requiring UACs to be kept in safe, sanitary conditions,
though not explicitly quantifying a constitutional violation if these conditions are not
met).
137. See generally Complaint, Lucas R. v. Alex Azar, No. 2:18-CV-05741, 1, 45
(C.D. Cal. filed June 29, 2018) (describing a facility transfer without notice or due
process).
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contractor exceptions."' The ORR and its contracting organizations are
routinely in violation of both its own standards and the standards of the
federal government as put forward in the Refugee Act and PREA, resulting
in consistent violation of the constitutional rights of immigrant juveniles. 3 9
There is a disturbing pattern in how the judiciary treats allegations of
abuse and due process violations brought forward by immigrant juveniles
filing Bivens claims against officials of the ORR and the U.S. government. 140
Despite repeated, verifiable claims by immigrant juveniles of ORR
employees knowing of or being informed of abuse occurring at multiple
immigrant juvenile detention facilities, halfway homes, and foster care
facilities, U.S. courts in multiple districts continually dismiss Fifth
Amendment Bivens claims against the ORR.14' This directly results in the
repeated physical, mental, and sexual abuse of immigrant juveniles in the
care of the ORR and its contracted agencies. 1
42
Rather than examine these thorny issues, courts use the FTCA loopholes
to exculpate the ORR and the U.S. government from responsibility for the
multitude of due process rights violations in ORR-contracted foster care
facilities.143 Despite federal regulation requiring the ORR to supervise its
contracted facilities and provide regulations for the conditions of those
facilities and the behavior of their associated staff, courts permit the
discretionary function exception of the FTCA to negate responsibility for the
ORR and its employees.144 Courts may wish to prevent the government and
138. See Fabian v. Dunn, No. SA-08-CV-269-XR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348 *1,
"16 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (dismissing the plaintiffs' Bivens claim through the discretionary
function exception).
139. See generally E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, 600 Fed. App'x 205, 208 (5th Cir. 2015)
(holding that the plaintiffs' Bivens claim was unfounded as the ORR had begun
monitoring the AFH facility).
140. Compare Fabian, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, at *16 (dismissing the Bivens
claim against the defendants), with E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, 600 Fed. App'x 205, 208 (5th
Cir. 2015) (declaring that since the plaintiffs did not initially bring a Bivens claim, it
could not be discussed on appeal).
141. Compare Fabian, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, at *9 (claiming that ORR
employees allowed abusive staff members to remain despite knowing about the abuse),
with E.A.F.F., 600 Fed. App'x at 214 (detailing a report made by an independent,
unbiased monitor of physical abuse and unnecessary violence in the facility).
142. See E.A.F.F., 600 Fed. App'x at 208 (detailing the abuses at AFH).
143. See id. at 9-10 (detailing the abuses at the AFH facility); see also Fabian, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, at * 11 (detailing abuses at the Abraxas facility).
144. See Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Sexual Abuse and Sexual
Harassment Involving Unaccompanied Children, 79 Fed. Reg. 77768, 77769-70 (Dec.
24, 2014) (citing the Presidential Memorandum); see also Fabian v. Dunn, No. SA-08-
CV-269-XR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348 *1, *15 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (dismissing the
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its employees from being unduly burdened with claims of abuse, such as
those put forward in Walding v. United States, but this attitude results in the
repeated dismissal of immigrant juveniles' Fifth Amendment claims without
due examination or analysis. 145 ORR employees are required not only by
federal regulation but also by Presidential Memorandum following the
implementation of PREA in 2003 to ensure that all protective laws and
regulations for pre-trial detention, both state and federal, are met. 146 As
shown in Walding, the ORR, despite being the legal and financial guardian
of UACs in their care, and employing public and private agencies to perform
caretaking duties as described by the Refugee Act, is not interfering with or
holding those contracted agencies responsible for violating the constitutional
rights of the immigrant juveniles in their facilities. 147
The Supreme Court's decision in Kingsley, that pre-trial detainees have
the onus to show that official use of force must be objectively unreasonable
to be excessive, came down in 2015 after the decision of the Western District
Court of Texas in E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez and long after Fabian v. Dunn was
decided in 2009.148 Neither the district court nor the attorneys for the
plaintiffs could use Kingsley as a guiding point for the standard of behavior
by guards in the AFH or the Abraxas facilities. 149 The decision in Kingsley,
had it come earlier, may have resulted in different decisions in cases like
E.A.F.F.150 Kingsley establishes that objectively unreasonable force violates
the Fifth Amendment due process rights of pre-trial detainees, including
Bivens claim).
145. See Walding, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 762 (laying out the dismissal of two of three
claims against the U.S. government, the ORR, and the ORR's contracting organization
through the discretionary function exception); see also Fabian, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72348, at * 15-16 (further detailing the plaintiffs' Bivens claim in the wake of staff abuse).
146. See Prison Rape Elimination Act, 34 U.S.C. § 30302 (2017) (listing all of the
purposes of PREA); see also Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Sexual Abuse
and Sexual Harassment Involving Unaccompanied Children, 79 Fed. Reg. at 13100
(establishing administrative tactics for containment centers to handle sexual abuse and
assault).
147. See E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, 600 Fed. App'x 205, 212 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (showing
that despite being informed that the conditions at AFH were disturbing by an independent
monitor, the ORR did little to avert them).
148. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2015) (holding that the
standard of unreasonableness for use of force in pre-trial detention is objective, not
subjective).
149. Compare Walding v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 2d 759, 768 (W.D. Tex. 2013)
(providing an overview of the abuses at the AFH facility), with Fabian, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 72348, at * 15-16 (providing an overview of abuse at the Abraxas facility).
150. See generally E.A.F.F., 600 Fed. App'x at 205 (dismissing the plaintiffs' abuse
and absolving the ORR of culpability for the constitutional rights violations).
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immigrant juveniles.' 5 ' Courts using the Kingsley standard must decide
whether that use of force was unreasonable based on the perspective of a
reasonable officer in a similar situation and account for the legitimate interest
of the government in facility management. 5 2 The behavior of the staffers in
not only the AFH facility in Nixon, Texas, but also in the Abraxas and Yolo
facilities do not and cannot qualify as reasonable force under the standard set
out in Kingsley.'53
While it is true that objective reasonability is decided based on the facts
and circumstances of each individual case where the term is determined
through a two-part analysis by the court, there is no conceivable manner in
which a judge or jury might determine that the behavior of the staff at
Abraxas or at the AFH facility was reasonable. 5 4 Physical assaults by staff
against plaintiffs held at the facility, not just with fists but with feet and
chairs, cannot be declared objectively reasonable by any set of facts or
circumstances. '5 5 Nor can the standard for retrieving runaways, as described
by the independent monitor from the International Catholic Migration
Commission, be objectively reasonable when an immigrant juvenile is
dragged back to the facility with his hands bound. 15 6 The ORR staff's abuse
of plaintiffs in Lucas R. v. Alex Azar also exceeds the standard of objectively
unreasonable force; deliberately spraying pepper spray into an immigrant
juvenile's eyes and ears until he loses his hearing, forcing him to wash his
face in toilet water, or ripping his earring out of the lobe cannot be seen as a
reasonable use of force, as required by Kingsley.
15 7
151. See Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2468 (holding a pre-trial detainee must show that
force knowingly used against him was objectively reasonable to be excessive).
152. See id. at 2473 (describing the two prongs of the Kingsley unreasonable force
standard).
153. See id. at 2470 (declaring that the standard is objective, not subjective); see also
Walding, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 768 (listing a myriad of abuses); see also Fabian v. Dunn,
No. SA-08-CV-269-XR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348 *1, *15 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 14,
2009) (listing various incidents of abusive actions by staff); see also Complaint, Lucas
R. v. Alex Azar, No. 2:18-CV-05741, 1, 13, 41-46 (C.D. Cal. filed Jun. 29, 2018)
(describing abuse of a seventeen-year-old immigrant juvenile in ORR custody).
154. See Walding, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 768 (describing the beatings at the facility); see
also Fabian, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, at *15 (listing the instances of abuse).
155. See Fabian, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, at *7 (describing the physical assault
involving furniture).
156. See E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, 600 Fed App'x 205, 212 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating that
the independent monitor was so disturbed by the action she felt obligated to inform the
ORR).
157. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) (discussing the
objectivity standard); see also Complaint, Lucas R. v. Alex Azar, No. 2:18-CV-05741,
1, 11, 41-46 (C.D. Cal. filed Jun. 29, 2018) (describing unreasonable force used
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Nor are there legitimate interests derived from the government's need to
manage the detention facility in the repeated beatings of immigrant juveniles
in the Abraxas and AFH facilities. 158 While the restraint of some immigrant
juveniles in ORR custody may become necessary, depending on
circumstances, beating an immigrant juvenile with a chair or verbally
abusing him until he attempts suicide cannot be in the government's need for
facility management. 159 There is no legitimate government interest in the
abuse of immigrant juveniles in its care, nor in the violation of their
constitutional rights. 6 ' By using the discretionary function exception of the
FTCA, U.S. courts are not only allowing the ORR to blatantly violate its
mandated duties under both the Refugee Act and PREA, but also to expressly
violate the Fifth Amendment due process rights of immigrant juveniles in
their custody to remain free from physical, emotional, or sexual abuse.
16 1
Even if courts continue to excuse the actions of the ORR and its contracted
facilities and staff under Bivens claims, the Kingsley standard makes it clear:
the ORR and its contractors recurrently violate the Fifth Amendment rights
of immigrant juveniles at multiple facilities across the United States. 162 The
application of the Kingsley standard condemning objectively unreasonable
force for pre-trial detainees prevents the violation of immigrant juveniles'
constitutional rights. 1
63
against a seventeen-year-old immigrant juvenile in ORR custody).
158. See Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473 (elaborating on the legitimate interests of the
government in conjunction with objectively reasonable or unreasonable behavior).
159. See Fabian v. Dunn, No. SA-08-CV-269-XR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348 *1,
*5-8, *15 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (describing further incidents at the facility which are not
outlined in the ORR Standards).
160. See Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473 (describing the government's legitimate interest
in smoothly running facilities); see also Fabian, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, at *8
(describing a suicidal immigrant juvenile being placed in solitary without mental health
assistance).
161. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (declaring no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without the due process of law); see also Prison Rape Elimination Act, 34
U.S.C. § 30302 (2017) (defining the nine-fold purposes of PREA); see also Standards to
Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Sexual Abuse and Sexual Harassment Involving
Unaccompanied Children, 79 Fed. Reg. 77768, 77770 (Dec. 24, 2014) (describing the
implementation of the regulations following Presidential Memorandum issued by
President Obama in 2013).
162. See Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2470; see also Complaint, Lucas R. v. Alex Azar, No.
2:18-CV-05741, 41-46 (demonstrating that unnecessary force is commonly used in
immigrant juvenile detention).
163. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) (describing the
objectivity standard); see also Walding v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 2d 759, 768 (W.D.
Tex. 2013) (providing an overview of constitutional rights violations at the AFH facility);
24
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol27/iss3/5
BROKEN BONES AND PEPPER SPRAY
2. Courts Must Apply the Bell Test in Cases Involving Constitutional
Rights Violations of Immigrant Juveniles
Since the 1970s and the Supreme Court's decision in Ingraham v. Wright,
Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment are not
afforded to pre-trial detainees.' 64 Because immigrant juveniles cannot be
protected under the Eighth Amendment, they must be protected under the
Fifth - but courts repeatedly deny them that privilege.165 The Bell test was
originally meant to apply only to circumstances where the conditions or
restrictions of pre-trial detention could amount to punishment. 166 Courts
have deprived immigrant juveniles of an opportunity to prove that their
constitutional rights have been violated through a Bivens claim; as such,
courts should instead apply the Bell test to preserve the constitutional rights
of immigrant juveniles. 167
Courts have disastrously overturned Bivens claims through the application
of the discretionary function exception in the FTCA to absolve ORR officials
of culpability no matter the kind of punitive conditions plaintiffs endure; the
application of the discretionary function exception eliminates any kind of
power Bivens claims may have wielded in years past. 168  The proper
application of the Bell test to cases such as Fabian v. Dunn or E.A.F.F. v.
Gonzalez would hold ORR officials responsible for their indifference to
continued abusive conditions at both the Abraxas and AFH facilities, and
would protect the constitutional rights of immigrant juveniles held in these
facilities. 169
see also Fabian, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, at *15 (providing an overview of
constitutional rights violations at the Abraxas facility).
164. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 (1977) (stating that pre-trial
detainees in the United States are protected by the Fifth Amendment).
165. See Fabian v. Dunn, No. SA-08-CV-269-XR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, *1,
"18 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (noting that the evidence offered by plaintiffs did not allow for a
Bivens claim); see also E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, 600 Fed. App'x 205, 208, 216 (W.D. Tex.
2015) (holding that the plaintiffs' Bivens claim was untenable).
166. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 520 (1979) (establishing the Bell test to be
used in pre-trial detention centers).
167. Compare Fabian, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, at *11 (applying Fifth
Amendment analysis to the Bivens claim), with E.A.F.F., 600 Fed. App'x at 208 (stating
plaintiffs' claims of deliberate indifference by ORR employees).
168. Compare Fabian, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, at *11 (discussing the
application of Fifth Amendment analysis to the case), with E.A.F.F., 600 Fed. App'x at
208 (claiming that it was the deliberate indifference of ORR employees that resulted in
a violation of plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment rights).
169. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 520-21 (describing the purpose of the Bell test alongside its
implementation).
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The Bell test clearly states that conditions which are so arbitrary or
purposeless that can only reasonably be inferred to be punitive by a court
violate the standards set forth in Bell, and qualify as violations of the Fifth
Amendment rights of detainees. 170 The conditions at the Abraxas and AFH
facilities clearly violate that standard. 17 1 The conditions in the AFH facility,
especially policies regarding restraint and physical punishment as recorded
by an independent monitor, were applied punitively and thus went against
every standard set forth in the Bell test. 172 Dragging a runaway back to the
AFH facility with his hands tied behind his back reaches a level of
arbitrariness that can only be fully justified if the intent is punitive, which
would be a clear violation of the Bell test. 171 Similarly, the staff at Abraxas
deliberately placed a suicidal immigrant juvenile - an immigrant juvenile
who later alleged that his suicide attempt was due to the extensive, horrific
verbal abuse at the facility - into solitary confinement without access to
psychiatric care or a doctor, even though mental health care is one of many
services these contracted facilities are meant to provide. 174 The arbitrary
nature of this denial fundamentally has no purpose aside from punishment,
and it clearly violates the Bell test. 
175
The conditions endured by multiple plaintiffs named in Lucas R. v. Alex
Azar violate the standards put forth in the Bell test. 17 6 The ORR's repeated
transfers of immigrant juveniles between facilities without providing notice,
opportunity for appeal, or proper reason appears to have no particular
purpose, except punishment, in violation of the Bell standard. 177 For the
170. See id. (clarifying the multiple prongs of the Bell test).
171. Compare Fabian v. Dunn, No. SA-08-CV-269-XR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72348, *1, *11 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (discussing the application of Fifth Amendment
analysis to the case), with E.A.F.F., 600 Fed. App'x at 208 (claiming that it was the
deliberate indifference of ORR employees that resulted in a violation of plaintiffs' Fifth
Amendment rights).
172. See E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, 600 Fed. App'x 205, 212 (5th Cir. 2015) (describing
the conditions of the facility and its effect on its inhabitants).
173. See id. (accounting the experience of the runaway as seen by the independent
monitor).
174. See Fabian, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, at *8 (delineating an arbitrary
practice of isolating suicidal detainees).
175. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 520-21 (1979) (establishing a secondary
aspect of the Bell test regarding reasonable inference).
176. See generally Complaint, Lucas R. v. Alex Azar, No. 2:18-CV-05741, 1, 41-
46, 51 (C.D. Cal. filed Jun. 29, 2018) (detailing the experiences of multiple named
immigrant juveniles detained as UACs in custody across a variety of ORR facilities).
177. See id. at 40-46 (describing multiple unexplained transfers after multiple
violent incidents).
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ORR to keep a child from his father without establishing any kind of reason
for maintaining that custody, and to keep that child in purposeless
confinement in which he experiences a variety of physical and constitutional
rights abuses, is a violation of the Bell test. 
178
The Flores settlement, which ensures immigrant juveniles are kept in
detention for months or even years before their hearings, could be declared
punitive in and of itself under the Bell test. 17 9 As determined in Reno v.
Flores, the continued detention of immigrant juveniles without a parent,
relative, or guardian is not a violation of those juveniles' constitutional rights
so long as the custody is both decent and humane. 80 While the length of
confinement is supposedly restricted to the length of time before the
juvenile's deportation hearing, it is essentially limitless, restrained only by
an immigrant juvenile filing a writ of habeas corpus and showing that the
Attorney General is not properly processing the deportation proceeding with
all due speed.' 8 ' Immigrant juveniles such as Miguel Angel, who have
family members or guardians willing and able to care for them in an
appropriate environment outside of ORR custody, cannot legally be kept
from being released prior to their hearings according to the Flores settlement
because their constitutional rights are at stake. 18 2 As seen in Miguel Angel's
case, denial of release can result in continuing abuses and due process rights
violations; the ORR has already transferred Miguel Angel twice with no
178. See id. at 48 (noting that Miguel Angel's father has passed the ORR's
background and home checks); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 520-21 (describing
the use of reasonable inference in the Bell test).
179. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 324 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (declaring
that the only limit on the length of confinement of immigrant juveniles is a writ of habeas
corpus based on a "conclusive showing" that the Attorney General has not processed the
deportation hearing in a reasonable amount of time). See also Stipulated Settlement
Agreement at 1, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(contradicting the concern in the dissent in Reno v. Flores by not categorizing excessive
stays in government custody as a constitutional rights violation, despite potential
conditions of the housing).
180. But see id. at 324 (determining the requirements for ORR custody). But see
generally Stipulated Settlement Agreement at 1, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-
RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. 1997) (describing the requirements of UAC care by the INS, now
ORR, in non-constitutional terms).
181. See id. at 324 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the INS rule did not actually
impose a time limit for detaining immigrant juveniles).
182. See Complaint, Lucas R. v. Alex Azar, No. 2:18-CV-05741, 1, 40-46 (C.D.
Cal. filed June 29, 2018) (stating that while the inspection of Miguel Angel's father's
apartment indicated no problems, Miguel Angel has not been released, and the ORR has
provided no explanation as to why).
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notice or chance for appeal.' 83 Immigrant juveniles cannot have their rights
guaranteed under the Due Process Clause if they are confined without a time
limit, even if willing and able guardians await their safe return.1
8 4
3. The Standard ofIndifference Test Set Forward in Farmer v. Brennan
Should Be Used to Provide Protections to Immigrant Juveniles
Farmer v. Brennan offers a third alternative to rectify the constitutional
rights violations immigrant juveniles experience while in the custody of the
ORR. 185 Prior to Ingraham v. Wright, the Eighth Amendment had only been
applied to punishments for post-conviction prisoners, as the Eighth
Amendment of the Constitution strictly outlaws cruel and unusual
punishment by the state. 8 6 Accordingly, the test refined in Farmer v.
Brennan has not been applied to immigrant juveniles detained prior to their
deportation hearing since they have not yet been convicted of a crime, and
therefore in theory cannot be cruelly or unusually punished by the state. 187
However, each alternative presented by the courts for immigrant juveniles
to file against the ORR and its affiliated agencies are overturned by the
discretionary function exception of the FTCA.' 88  The detention of
immigrant juveniles becomes entirely punitive through the deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of the immigrant juveniles by the
ORR and its public and private contracted care organizations. 189 The Farmer
183. See id. (referencing the second of two transfers so far).
184. See Flores, 507 U.S. at 310 (detailing that unaccompanied minors should only
be released to their parents, relatives, a guardian, or a vetted foster home).
185. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 825 (1994) (holding that prison officials
may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment if they are found to be deliberately
indifferent to a significant danger to the health or safety of a prison inmate).
186. See id. (describing the holding in Farmer); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 671-72 (1977) (delineating that pre-trial detainees are protected by the Fifth
Amendment and post-conviction detainees are protected by the Eighth Amendment).
187. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 825 (outlining the Farmer principle); see also Walding
v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 2d 759, 788 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (stating that the plaintiffs
claim that the ORR officials violated their due process rights); see also Fabian v. Dunn,
No. SA-08-CV-269-XR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, *1, *11 (W.D. Tex. 2009)
(claiming that defendants violated the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment rights); see also
Complaint, Lucas R. v. Alex Azar, No. 2:18-CV-05741, 1, 4 (C.D. Cal. filed Jun. 29,
2018) (claiming the ORR violated the Due Process Clause).
188. See E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, 600 Fed. App'x 205, 208 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (affirming
the district court's holding that the plaintiffs' Bivens claim could not be maintained in
the face of the discretionary function exception); see also Fabian, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72348, at *23-4, 27 (holding that the discretionary function exception provided immunity
to ORR employees).
189. See Complaint, Lucas R. v. Alex Azar, No. 2:18-CV-05741, 44 (detailing the
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test of deliberate indifference offers an alternative to solely relying on Bivens
claims and the Bell test to provide relief to immigrant juveniles subject to
abuse while in ORR's custody.' 90
This standard of deliberate indifference put forth in Farmer v. Brennan
has been applied in cases of abuse in ORR facilities, providing a potential
source of succor for immigrant juveniles held in pre-trial detention.' 9' The
immigrant juveniles' Bivens claim in E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez references
Farmer v. Brennan when referring to the behavior of ORR officials
regarding abusive staff members of the AFH facility, declaring that ORR
officials were deliberately indifferent to the plight of immigrant juveniles in
the facility. 192 The standard of deliberate indifference described in E.A.F.F.
v. Gonzalez was the same standard enumerated in Farmer v. Brennan for
prisoners who have been convicted of crimes: officers at prisons or detention
centers can be held liable under the Eighth Amendment if they are aware that
prisoners or detainees face a substantial risk of harm and fail to take
reasonable measures to prevent or abate that harm. '9' By examining the use
of the deliberate indifference language put forward in Farmer v. Brennan,
the District Court of Texas indicated a willingness to apply Eighth
Amendment protection language to pre-trial detainees, even though
Ingraham v. Wright disallowed the use of Eighth Amendmentprotections.
194
Although the court eventually overturned the Bivens claim put forward by
the plaintiffs, the court's use of Farmer v. Brennan and its language of
deliberate indifference provides an outlet for restitution and justice for
immigrant juveniles. '9
abusive behavior of contracted ORR employees towards immigrant juveniles).
190. Compare Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-35 (explaining the deliberate indifference test
as applied to post-conviction prisoners), with E.A.F.F., 600 Fed. App'x at 210 (applying
the same deliberate indifference test to pre-trial plaintiffs' Bivens claim).
191. See E.A.F.F., 600 Fed. App'x at 210-11 (explaining the deliberate indifference
standard set forth in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 825).
192. See id. at 215 (stating that the behavior of ORR officials did not meet the standard
of deliberate indifference laid out in Farmer).
193. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 825-26 (1994) (elaborating further that
deliberate indifference is more than negligence, but less than acts or omissions to
intentionally cause harm).
194. See E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, 600 Fed. App'x 205, 210 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying
Eighth Amendment protective language as written in Farmer v. Brennan to pre-trial
detainees). Compare Farmer, 511 U.S. at 825-26 (defining deliberate indifference as a
strategy to apply Eighth Amendment protections to prisoners), with Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 671-72 (1977) (stating that pre-trial detainees are not protected by the
Eighth Amendment).
195. See E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, 600 Fed. App'x at 210 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan to
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Courts have already applied the concept of deliberate indifference put
forward in Farmer to cases involving immigrant juveniles detained by the
ORR. 1 9 6 Through applying the Farmer deliberate indifference test, cases
such as Lucas R. v. Alex Azar could be decided with the full weight of the
deliberate indifference standard rather than dismissed through the
discretionary function exception that courts have frequently applied to
excuse ORR involvement in abuse.197 Like prison officials, ORR officials
and their affiliated staff can be held accountable to the Farmer standard if
they are aware that inmates or detainees face a substantial risk of harm and
disregard the risk by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent or abate
that harm.198
4. Conditions in ORR-Contracted Facilities Amount to Cruel and
Unusual Punishment and Eighth Amendment Protections Should Be
Extended to Detained Immigrant Juveniles
The application of only Fifth Amendment due process protections to pre-
trial detainees, whether through a Bivens claim, the Bell test, or jury-rigging
a Farmer deliberate indifference claim to apply to a pre-trial detainee
protected by the Due Process Clause, is insufficient to protect immigrant
juvenile detainees from state-sanctioned abuse by the ORR and its affiliated
agencies. 199 Applying the Eighth Amendment as well as the Fifth in
protection of immigrant juveniles' rights in pre-trial detention would rectify
the circumstances that cause further violence and abuse in the ORR's
contracted housing facilities. 200  Through the application of Eighth
Amendment protections, such as the deliberate indifference standard set
forth in Farmer and used in E.A.F.F., imprisoned immigrant juveniles may
be provided further protections through an alternative method to defend their
define deliberate indifference as a term of art).
196. See id. at 211 (applying the deliberate indifference test to the Bivens claim filed
by plaintiffs).
197. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 825 (explaining the deliberate indifference
standard); see also Complaint, Lucas R. v. Alex Azar, No. 2:18-CV-05741, 1, 41-46
(C.D. Cal. filed Jun. 29, 2018) (detailing ORR staff abuse towards immigrant juveniles
and the indifference of other employees).
198. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 834 (1994) (stating that prison officials must
be held accountable for acting with deliberate indifference to the safety of inmates).
199. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 688-89 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Supreme Court recognized that the Eighth Amendment had never before been confined
to criminal punishment).
200. See id. at 690 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that those who have not been
convicted of crimes have other constitutional protections available that have never been
determinative of Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment).
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constitutional rights should other tactics fail.201
Nothing in the text of the Eighth Amendment qualifies its application to
post-conviction detention.2 °2 The fact that the Eighth Amendment does not
specify between innocent or guilty parties, or pre- or post-conviction
detainees, should be enough to show that the Eighth Amendment was
intended to protect all those detained by the United States government, rather
than those convicted of a crime. 20 3  The majority opinion in Ingraham
determined that Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual
punishment only apply to post-conviction proceedings and confinement, and
that no behavior by the state, no matter how indifferent, could qualify as
punishment for those not yet convicted of crimes.20 4  However, as
demonstrated in cases against the ORR, cruel and unusual punishment is not
restricted solely to post-conviction detention.20 5  Nor are principles put
forward in cases confined to Eighth Amendment scrutiny, such as the
deliberate indifference principle, restricted solely to prisoners post-
conviction.20 6 If an ORR official is aware of a substantial risk of harm to an
immigrant juvenile held in one of the public or private detainment centers
and does not take reasonable steps to attempt to prevent that harm, then the
ORR official must be held accountable for the harm done to that detainee
under the same standard as E.A.F.F.
20 7
Rather than continuing to apply Bivens claims based solely on Fifth
Amendment protections, which are nullified by courts' consistent
applications of the discretionary function exception, courts should instead
201. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 825 (stating that deliberate indifference to severe danger
to an inmate violates that inmate's Eighth Amendment rights); see also E.A.F.F. v.
Gonzalez, 600 Fed. App'x 205, 208 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying the deliberate indifference
standard to pre-trial detention).
202. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (stating that cruel and unusual punishments shall
not be inflicted on those convicted of crimes in the United States).
203. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 685 (White, J., dissenting) (analyzing the text of the
Eighth Amendment to show that it was not intended only to protect those convicted of
crimes).
204. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 651 (1977) (providing that only convicted
criminals could be cruelly and unusually punished).
205. See Complaint, Lucas R. v. Alex Azar, No. 2:18-CV-05741, 1, 41-46 (C.D.
Cal. filed Jun. 29, 2018) (providing an account of a seventeen-year-old male immigrant
juvenile being held against the wall with an ORR staff member's elbow pressed to his
throat).
206. See E.A.F.F., 600 Fed. App'x at 210-11 (explaining and applying the deliberate
indifference standard).
207. See id. (describing the standard of deliberate indifference); see also Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 520 (1979) (outlining the steps in the Bell test).
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allow pre-trial detainees, like immigrant juveniles, to demonstrate through a
Bivens claim that officers of the federal government working for the ORR
violated their Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual
punishment.20 8 While immigrant juveniles in pre-trial detention may not be
able to raise a successful claim under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, the conditions or restrictions of that pre-trial detention which are or
were punitively intended constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.20 9
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
Permitting contracted organizations to repeatedly violate the Fifth
Amendment through the discretionary function exception and independent
contractor exception allows for the perpetuation of a cycle of physical,
emotional, and sexual abuse of immigrant juveniles in ORR custody. 2 10
Regarding the contracting organizations of the ORR as independent
contractors and not government employees is not only illogical, but also
continues a cycle of repeated constitutional violations of immigrant juveniles
supposedly in the care and custody of the ORR and its Director. 21' As such,
the U.S. must re-examine and re-define the term "government employee" to
also apply to contractors providing care to UACs on behalf of the ORR, thus
providing tangible, actionable recourse to immigrant juveniles whose
constitutional rights are violated by staff of contracted agencies.
21 2
The seeming incapability of district courts to hold the ORR and its
contracted agencies accountable for employee action directly violates the
208. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456
F.2d 1339, 1341 (1972) (declaring that federal officers do not hold immunity from
damages in suits claiming that they violated someone's constitutional rights). Compare
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 684 (White, J., dissenting) (declaring that the Eighth Amendment
should not only apply to post-conviction detention), with Fabian v. Dunn, No. SA-08-
CV-269-XR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, *1, *11 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (providing an
overview of the Bivens claim made by plaintiffs).
209. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 684 (White, J., dissenting) (determining that the
Eighth Amendment applies to all people, not just those convicted of crimes).
210. See generally Walding v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 2d 759, 791 (W.D. Tex.
2013) (dismissing the case after applying the discretionary function and independent
contractor exceptions).
211. See generally E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, 600 Fed. App'x 205, 207-08 (W.D. Tex.
2015) (stating that the plaintiffs continued to suffer abuses at the facility after the initial
report and response by the ORR).
212. See Walding, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (declaring "government contractors" to not
be government employees).
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Fifth Amendment rights of immigrant juveniles. 213 The ORR should not be
excused from the tortious actions of its contracted agencies; through the
ORR's continued contracting with agencies and their employees known to
violate the constitutional rights of immigrant juveniles, the ORR itself is
violating the Fifth Amendment due process rights of UACs." 4 Both the
Director and the ORR must be held responsible for the actions of these
contractors under the responsibilities granted to them by the Refugee Act,
PREA, the Flores settlement, and the U.S. Constitution. 2 5  The Fifth
Amendment protections already provided to immigrant juveniles in ORR
custody must be properly enforced through application of Bivens claims, the
Bell test, Kingsley protections, and, upon expanding the Eighth Amendment
to apply to ORR detention, the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
in pre-conviction detention.1 6
CONCLUSION
Immigrant detention has long been held to be pre-trial detention, protected
under the Fifth Amendment right to due process.2' However, as indicated
in Bell v. Wolfish, if the conditions of that confinement trespass beyond a
legitimate relationship to a governmental purpose, and are purely in place to
act as a punitive measure, then those conditions violate the Eighth
Amendment rights of the immigrants detained in detention centers and
prisons across the nation.21 8
Although the U.S. government's detention of immigrant juveniles is
classified as civic, pre-trial detention, the extent of the abuses perpetrated by
the ORR and its contracted public and private detention centers are extreme
and violate both the Fifth and Eighth Amendment.2 19 Should the courts
213. See generally Fabian, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72348, at *27 (holding that the
ORR was not responsible for the extensive abuses committed at the Abraxas facility
despite contracting the agency).
214. See generally E.A.F.F., 600 Fed. App'x at 208 (noting the firing of only a single
staff member, rather than all those accused of abuse, making the ORR culpable for further
possible instances of abuse in the facility).
215. See supra Part III.A (describing the ORR's destruction of federal laws as well as
its violation of the constitutional rights of immigrant juveniles).
216. See generally E.A.F.F., 600 Fed. App'x at 210-11 (applying the deliberate
indifference standard developed in Farmer as well as a Bivens claim).
217. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 520 (stating that conditions or restrictions in
pretrial detention only violate constitutional rights if they qualify as punishment); see
also supra Part III (showing how the constitutional rights of juveniles are violated by the
ORR).
218. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 520 (1979) (describing the Bell test).
219. Compare R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1155 (D. Haw. 2006) (holding
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examine the disproportionately punitive conditions of immigrant juveniles,
those conditions clearly would not fulfill the Bell test or the standard put
forward in Farmer, and would violate both the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments. °
that the abusive treatment of LGBTQ juvenile detainees at HYCF violated their due
process rights), with E.A.F.F. v. Gonzalez, 600 Fed. App'x 205, 207 (W.D. Tex. 2013)
(listing abuses inflicted on UACs at the AFH facility in Texas).
220. See supra Part III.B (describing how immigrant juveniles are denied due process
and are cruelly and unusually punished while in custody).
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